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MUTUALITY OF REMEDY IN OHIO: A JOURNEY
FROM ABSTRACTION TO PARTICULARISM
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN*
The author traces the development of the doctrine of mutuality
of remedy in Ohio from its origination down to its present posture.
He not only indicates how the law on mutuality of remedy has been
liberalized, but offers an explanation of the reasons for this change.
I. INTRODUCTION
The genesis of "modern" equity springs from the harshness and
confinement of a primitive common law system. When denied relief in
the common law courts because of a tightly structured and inflexible
writ system which refused to absorb new forms of action, litigants
turned to equity as a means of obtaining satisfaction.1 As the result of
a concern with justice in the broadest sense,' chancellors gradually
developed and systematized a body of rules or principles to be followed
in decision-making and as a standard against which the conflicting
claims of the litigants could be measured. The very essence of equity
is summarized by these principles: "he who seeks equity must do
equity... ; he who comes into equity must come with clean hands...;
equality is equity."'
On the other hand, equity has not been completely immune to the
very same malady that precipitated its own birth. That problem is rule
crystallization. A principle developed for the justice and convenience
of a particular situation and for the peculiarities existing in the society
of a given era has, on occasion, solidified into an unreasoned and
immutable command that eventually does violence to the flexibility
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace
College.
1 For an excellent discussion of the interplay between law and equity see C.
Allen, Law in the Making 366-408 (Oxford paperback 1961). See generally Adams, "The
Origin of English Equity," 16 Colum. L. Rev. 87 (1916); Glenn & Redden, "Equity:
A Visit To the Founding Fathers," 31 Va. L. Rev. 753 (1945).
2 One commentator concludes that equity
may be used to denote one of at least three different conceptions. It may mean:
(1) a body of rules; (2) an historical source of rules in modem English Law; or
(3) an abstract idea of justice, distinct from that which motivates the common
law, and which may be the starting-point of new rules of law, which are termed
'equitable.'
G. Keeton, An Introduction to Equity 2-3 (6th ed. 1965).
3 H. McClintock, Equity 52 (2d ed. 1948). See generally G. Keeton, supra note 2,
at 55-78.
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upon which equity is predicated. Perhaps the best example of equitable
"hardening of the arteries" is the doctrine of mutuality of remedy.
In 1858 Edward Fry, an English jurist and legal scholar, remarked
that "a contract to be specifically enforced must be mutual-that is to
say, such that it might, at the time that it was entered into, have been
enforced by either of the parties against the other of them."4 Since
Fry, in promulgating his version of the rule, was dealing with specific
performance, the term "enforced" has been interpreted to mean a
reciprocity of specific performance as a remedy.' As a practical matter,
mutuality of remedy is applied both affirmatively and negatively. The
plaintiff is allowed specific performance even though he would not be
entitled to such relief if the defendant had been the aggrieved party;
the plaintiff is denied specific performance if the defendant would not
be entitled to the same relief had he been the injured party.,
Almost from the date the rule first appeared, it generated a pleth-
ora of criticism and confusion.' Courts immediately fell into the error
of defining and discussing "mutuality" as an all-embracing general
term with no distinction between remedy and obligation. On occasion,
assent and consideration have been included under the umbrella of the
term. The comprehensiveness of a word like "mutuality" invites fre-
quent use of the term. Hence, it is not surprising to discover that it
has been mistakenly employed to "hold a contract invalid because the
obligation undertaken on one side is not commensurate with that
undertaken on the other."8
Besides inviting indiscriminate and paralogistic application, mutu-
ality of remedy suffers from serious conceptual defects. The use of the
negative aspect of the rule, which is invoked more frequently and is
more troublesome than the affirmative part, presupposes an unwilling-
ness on the plaintiff's part to carry out his part of the bargain. Thus
from the solitary fact that the defendant would not be entitled to
4 H. McClintock, supra note 3, at 181. Mutuality of remedy as a broad concept is
not indigenous to equity. It has been pointed out that "the common law has endeavored
to work out this principle in terms of implied conditions .... " Durfee, "Mutuality In
Specific Performance," 20 Mich. L. Rev. 289, 295 (1922).
5 SA A. Corbin, Contracts § 1180 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Corbin].
6 When applied to the same fact situation the two formulations of the rule
can create what has been called an "absurd" result. Corbin § 1178.
7 One early critic remarked that "The rule as to mutuality of remedy is obscure
in principle and in extent, artificial, and difficult to understand and to remember."
Langdell, Note, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1887).
8 W. Wlliston, Contracts § 105A at 424 (3d ed. Jaeger 1957). As a means of
avoiding confusion, one writer suggests the use of the terms "equality of remedy,"
"identity of remedy," or "convertibility of remedy," rather than mutuality of remedy.
Durfee, supra note 4, at 292 n.9.
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specific performance, it is dogmatically concluded that the plaintiff
would refuse to perform once he obtained relief. Yet the day to day
exchanges of the commercial world refute such an assumption. More-
over, why should one who has suffered a breach of contract be denied
the relief to which he would normally be entitled merely because the
perpetrator of the breach would himself be unable to obtain specific
performance. Refusing to grant specific performance because of these
grounds is incompatible with the basic tenets of equity jurisprudence.
The rule frequently breaks down in operation. Fry noted four
exceptions to the negative part of the rule in 1858.' Ames expanded
the list to eight and succinctly articulated the growing dissatisfaction
with the rule by remarking that "mutuality, as commonly expressed, is
inaccurate and misleading."' ° Ames' discontent with Fry's version of
mutuality resulted in the following restatement:
[E] quity will not compel specific performance by a defendant
if, after performance, the common law remedy of damages would be
his sole security for the performance of the plaintiff's side of the
contract.'
Ames succeeded in diluting much of the mathematical severity of
Fry's precise equation, but the rule propounded by Ames possessed a
rigidity of its own. There might be occasions where the injustice of
denying the plaintiff any relief would outweigh the possibility that the
defendant could resort only to damages at law. As the inflexibility
of Fry's rule carried the seeds of reaction, the formalism of Ames'
restatement likewise invited expansion. Moreover, Ames' rule became
subject to tensions nonexistent during the reign of Fry's approach to
the problem. Specifically, a dramatic transformation in legal thought
played a significant role in reshaping mutuality. The emergence of legal
realism, manifested in an attack upon the citadel of mechanical juris-
prudence, resulted in the erosion of the strict adherence to what had
been considered immutable legal rules.'
9 Options or contracts on condition performable by one party; mutuality waived
by subsequent conduct of the person against whom the contract originally
could not have been enforced; contracts enforceable under the statute of frauds
against only one party because he alone signed the writing; and cases of part
performance with compensation.
H. McClintock, supra note 3, at 181.
10 Ames, "Mutuality In Specific Performance," 3 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1903). Clark
expanded the list to ten. G. Clark, Equity §§ 175-80 (1954).
11 Ames, supra note 10, at 2-3.
12 Cardozo gives much of the credit for the modification of the Fry and Pomeroy
rules to the critical writings of law professors. Referring specifically to Ames, Lewis,
Stone, and Williston he states: "I have little doubt that if the university professors
had not intervened, the rule would have been extended by a process of purely logical
1967]
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As a result of these cross-pressures, mutuality of remedy was
converted into a more pliable doctrine that focused on competing
equities and on a reciprocity of performances. Section 372 of the Re-
statement of Contracts reflects the view that emerged. Equity is satis-
fied if the defendant will not "be wrongfully denied the agreed exchange
for his performance"' 3 and if he "will not be compelled to perform
specifically without good security that he will receive specifically the
agreed equivalent in exchange."'1
However, the codification of a legal formula does not always
square with the reality of the courtroom. The adversary system of
concrete and particularistic cases produces situations that in many
instances fail to fit into the confines of what is assumed to be the
"ccorrect" view. This is inevitable and desirable; it is the substance
of the creative life-force of our legal system. Perhaps this is what
prompted Cardozo to note that one of the important characteristics
of our legal system is a readiness "to subordinate logic to utility .... "
On the other hand, the disparity between what is thought to be a
modern view and the results of day to day decisions may be due to an
unwillingness to forsake the comfort and ease of outmoded and ritual-
istic thinking.
The purpose of this article is to trace mutuality of remedy in Ohio
from its earliest appearance in recorded decisions up to the contempo-
rary scene. An attempt will be made to focus on two interrelated lines
of inquiry: (1) the shifting perspective adopted by the Ohio judiciary
in recognizing and resolving mutuality of remedy, and (2) the present
posture of the Ohio position as measured against the Restatement's
flexible approach.
II. THE FORMATIVE PHASE, 1823-1890
Mutuality of remedy received attention by the Ohio Supreme
Court at least thirty-five years before Fry published his statement of
deduction, and things would have gone from bad to worse." B. Cardozo, The Growth
of the Law 14 (1924).
13 Restatement of Contracts § 372, comment a (1932).
14 Id. § 372 reads as follows:
(1) The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is not available to one
party is not a sufficient reason for refusing it to the other party.
(2) The fact that the remedy of specific enforcement is available to one party to
a contract is not in itself a sufficient reason for making the remedy available to
the other; but it is of weight when it accompanies other reasons, and it may
be decisive when the adequacy of damages is difficult to determine and there is
no other reason for refusing specific enforcement.
15 B. Cardozo, supra note 12, at 77.
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the rule.16 In 1799 James McNutt agreed to convey to John Hutcheson
one-half of the land that McNutt had the opportunity to take title to
under a military warrant. The agreement, signed only by McNutt, was
predicated upon the condition that Hutcheson would furnish payment
for half of the necessary expenses. Not until 1806, when a rise in land
value undoubtedly spurred action, Hutcheson demanded his half of
the property and offered to pay his portion of the expenses, but specific
performance was denied. After noting that the plaintiff had failed to
fulfill the condition precedent of advancing expense money, the court
emphasized that had McNutt been forced to make the conveyance
before receiving expenses, he would have had no recourse against the
plaintiff if the latter refused to make payment. The reason for this
conclusion was that the
contract was not signed by both parties, so as to give mutual
remedies. It is the contract of McNutt alone. Should the defendants
therefore execute the conveyance before the payment of the money,
they are left without recourse .... 17
Hutcheson is a manifestation of the early mechanical application
of the doctrine of mutuality of remedy. On one hand, it is entirely
consistent with the corresponding equities of the contracting parties
that the plaintiff should be denied relief until the defendant is assured
of the fulfillment of the condition precedent. But to deny relief here
because the defendant could not have asserted a claim against the
plaintiff because of the statute of frauds is to ignore the circumstances.
Here, Hutcheson relinquished the defense of the statute of frauds by
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. Even Fry recognized this
as an exception to the rule.' 8 Thus, in drawing upon Chancellor Kent's
dictum that "equity will never decree performance where the remedy
is not mutual, or one party only is bound by the agreement" (emphasis
supplied) ," the Ohio Supreme Court introduced a Draconian concept
of mutuality of remedy that was considerably more restrictive than
that later propounded by Fry.
Chancellor Kent's influence was persuasive 13 years later when
the State was denied specific performance on a written agreement by
which the defendant promised to lease or convey land for a canal.2 0
But there was a slight shift in definitional orientation. The court con-
cluded that since the contract required the governor's approval, which
16 Hutcheson v. Heirs of McNutt, 1 Ohio 15 (1821).
17 Id. at 17.
18 H. McClintock, supra note 3, at 181.
19 Hutcheson v. Heirs of McNutt, I Ohio 15, 20 (1821).
20 State v. Baum's Heirs, 6 Ohio 383 (1834).
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was missing, the State was not bound; therefore mutuality of remedy
did not exist. This was a subtle but far-reaching alteration of Kent's
rule. By stating that "specific performance will not be decreed when
the remedy is not mutual, as if only one party is bound by the agree-
ment" (emphasis supplied),21 the court erased the distinction between
mutuality of remedy and mutuality of obligation.
A point of interest is that the Hutcheson decision was ignored in
favor of Chancellor Kent's dictum. More than likely this was due to
the unavailability or lack of access to the published reports of Ohio
decisions. On the other hand, it perhaps shows a greater trust in
established and acknowledged authority, particularly when dealing with
an unfamiliar doctrine.
With this background, mutuality became a term with elastic
boundaries, sometimes denoting obligation, remedy, or even reciprocity
of consideration. A case might be argued and analyzed in terms of
obligation but resolved on the presence or absence of a mutual right
to specific performance. Such was the result in Richards v. Doyle 22
where two owners of an interest in realty, one of whom was a married
woman, sought specific performance against the vendee. The Supreme
Court of Ohio acknowledged that a woman "not having capacity
to bind herself to the performance of an executory contract, the
party assuming to contract with her, is not . . . obliged to perform
such contract on his part.' 23 The contract was considered by the court
to be void and unenforceable as to the married woman. Yet, viewing
the contract in its entirety, mutuality of both obligation and remedy
existed. The other vendor was bound and would have been subject to
specific performance. Satisfied that there was a reciprocity of specific
performance as to at least one of the plaintiffs, the court concluded
that "the contract did not lack either mutuality or consideration. 4
Despite the paucity of decisions, it is nevertheless evident that
mutuality of remedy was a recognized doctrine in Ohio case law,
though obviously there was a failure to properly distinguish remedy
from obligation. Perhaps the factual content of the cases played a
role in this confusion, or perhaps it was loose decisional draftsmanship.
But the fact remains that mutuality of remedy first appeared in a
restrictive, fairly well-defined form only to be merged with the nebu-
lous concept of mutuality of obligation.
21 Id. at 387.
22 36 Ohio St. 37 (1880).
23 Id. at 41.
24 Id. at 42.
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III. THE AGE OF POmEROY, 1891-1912
Even with this early confusion, mutuality of remedy was again
recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1891. In Steinau v. Cincinnati
Gas-Ligkt & Coke Co.25 the defendant agreed to purchase all his gas
requirements from the plaintiff. The defendant was obligated to use at
least three quarters of his previous average gas consumption. A nega-
tive covenant precluded the "use on said premises [of?] oil lamps,
electric lights, or other . . . power for general illuminating purposes
.... ;26 The advent of the more economical electric lamp prompted
the defendant to switch to electricity. The Gas Company attempted to
enforce the negative covenant. Pomeroy's theory prevailed with the
court stating that if the contract
cannot be specifically enforced against [the plaintiff], then . . .
he is not in general entitled to remedy of a specific performance
against his adversary . . . although otherwise there may be no
obstacle arising.., to an enforcement of the relief against the latter
individually.27
Thus mutuality was succinctly redefined in terms of reciprocity of
specific performance and forcefully injected into the mainstream of
Ohio case law. Yet in the same case the court predicted that the pro-
liferation of exceptions to the rule would eventually cause it to be of
little significance. This occurred in an extended discussion 8 reflecting
concern over the balancing of equities between the rule itself and
the Lumley v. Wagner qualification whereby negative covenants are
enforced despite an absence of mutuality of remedy.2 9 Four years
later the part performance exception appeared." A lessor rented his
boat livery facilities to the plaintiff. The contract contained a clause
whereby the plaintiff promised to "keep a first-class livery."13 ' When the
plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from ousting him from the livery
so that the premises could be leased to a third party, the lessor con-
25 48 Ohio St. 324, 27 N.E. 545 (1891).
26 Id. at 326, 27 N.E. at 546.
27 Id. at 332, 27 N.E. at 547. The plaintiff was, nevertheless, unable to obtain an
injunction since he was unsuccessful in convincing the court that damages at law were
unascertainable.
28 Id. at 332-35, 27 N.E. at 447-48.
29 The negative covenant poses two problems: (A) by granting an injunction
the court is, in effect, enforcing a personal service contract and thereby interfering with
the defendant's personal liberty; (B) the defendant would have been unable to obtain
specific performance against the plaintiff, i.e., no mutuality of remedy. Corbin § 1207.
30 Hepburn v. Voute, 5 Ohio Dec. 311 (1895). The part performance exception
had been recognized by Fry. See note 9 supra.
31 Hepburn v. Voute, 5 Ohio Dec. 311, 313 (1895).
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tended that the action should be dismissed because of a lack of mutu-
ality of remedy. The defendant argued that since he would be without
a remedy if the plaintiff decided not to abide by his promise to maintain
a "first-class" boathouse, the mutuality rule required that the plaintiff
be precluded from enforcing the rental contract. The court refused to
invoke the Steinau doctrine. Instead, the part performance exception
was recognized. A background of good faith compliance with the terms
of the lease made it unlikely that the plaintiff would suddenly break
his word once the jurisdiction of the court was lifted. The result of this
common pleas court's uncomfortableness with Steinau was a pragmatic
reconciliation of the harshness of mutuality with the exigencies of
commercial reality.
Although not raised in Hepburn, an element implicit in the part
performance exception is whether mutuality of remedy must exist from
the instant the contract becomes binding or whether it is sufficient that
there be mutuality at the time of litigation. Under the latter view,
which is a dilution of the Fry rule,3" equities such as partial perform-
ance can be taken into consideration. During the early 1900's the lower
courts, with one noteworthy exception,33 were unwilling to accept this
modification. Thus the part performance exception was precluded from
gaining acceptance34
Furthermore, during this period the Lumley v. Wagner exception
met resistance. A Cincinnati superior court refused to enforce a nega-
tive covenant by enjoining a theater from presenting performers other
than the plaintiff since any deviation from Pomeroy would be contrary
to the Steinau holding 5
The mood was thus one of adherence to a fixed doctrine. The
32 The origin of this modification can be traced to the younger Pomeroy. "This
change eliminated the large number of cases where relief was denied to a vender who had
not good title at the time he contracted, but was able to perfect the title . . ." H.
McClintock, supra note 3, at 182.
33 Trustee Co. v. Zimmer, 21 Ohio Dec. 657 (1910). Despite the fact that the "time
of litigation" view was adopted, specific performance was denied on the theory that
the defendant, once having entered into the leasehold, would have no remedy other than a
legal one if the plaintiff failed to perform. Equitable relief would have been unavailable
because:
The failure of the contract to embrace and provide the terms and conditions
which such contracts usually contain and should contain, completely demonstrates
that it lacks the usual essentials required of such contracts and renders it
impossible for a court of equity to enforce its specific performance.
Id. at 667.
34 Of course under the Restatement view such a distinction becomes moot. Restate-
ment of Contracts § 372 (1932).
35 Hill v. Anderson, 6 Ohio N.P. 111, 10 Ohio Dec. N.P. 432 (Super. Ct. 1899). In
addition to Steinau, the court relied heavily upon English authorities, including Jessel
and Fry.
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decisions in these cases were written in what Karl Llewellyn charac-
terized as the "formal style." Mutuality of remedy opinions during
the 1891-1912 period ran "in deductive form with an air or expression
of single-line inevitability,136 thus driving "conscious creation all but
underground, [making] change and growth things to be ignored in
opinions, and to be concealed not only from a public but from a self.")37
Yet, despite the dominance of Steinau and the imprint of the
"formal style," an undercurrent toward modification was developing.
The probing dictum that "many of the modern decisions have piled up
so many exceptions to the rule... that it has almost become useless"3
indicated an emerging dissatisfaction with Pomeroy's rule. But this
displeasure remained dormant until 1938.
IV. THE QUIET PERIOD, 1918-1938
For the twenty years between 1918 and 1938 the persuasiveness
of Steinau, with its clearly articulated statement of the rule, literally
disappeared from the scene. Only five cases involving mutuality of
remedy survive in the reports from this period, none of which are
Supreme Court of Ohio decisions; only three of the five can be con-
sidered directly on point.39 In two of the three cases on point the
application of the rules was fully justified. One dealt with the affirma-
tive aspect of the rule. The plaintiff, a vendor of real estate, obtained
a decree of specific performance on a contract since "the defendant
could have invoked the remedy of specific performance had the plain-
tiff refused to convey .... "4o The inadequacy of damages justified the
court's conclusion.4' Likewise the denial of specific performance where
the plaintiff contracted to "care for, nurse and support defendants
during their natural lives" 42 in exchange for the conveyance of realty
36 K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 38 (1960).
37 Id. at 40.
38 Trustee Co. v. Zimmer, 21 Ohio Dec. 657, 666 (1910).
39 Decided on mutuality of remedy: Forro v. Buckeye Realty of Cleveland, Inc.,
34 Ohio App. 299, 170 N.E. 878 (1929); Nunn v. Boal, 29 Ohio App. 141, 162 N.E. 724
(1928); Steel v. Murphy, 10 Ohio App. 150 (1918). Decided on mutuality of obligation:
Herley, Inc. v. Harsch, 61 Ohio App. 260, 22 N.E.2d 515 (1938); Meir Grape juice Co.
v. Koehne, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 619 (Ct. App. 1925).
40 Forro v. Buckeye Realty of Cleveland, Inc., 34 Ohio App. 299, 301, 170 N.E. 878
(1929).
41 Corbin concludes that application of the affirmative rule poses minimal problems.
The affirmative rule merely extends the remedy of specific performance to one
who is in no serious need of it, and does no harm to the defendant except as it
may increase the number of cases in which he can be deprived of a jury trial on
issues of fact.
Corbin § 1179, at 329.
42 Nunn v. Boal, 29 Ohio App. 141, 142, 162 N.E. 724 (1928).
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was consistent with the basic precepts of equity. The personal nature
of the plaintiff's duties were such that it would be impossible for a court
to supervise and hence assure satisfactory performance. 43
If the Steinau influence was suspended, the inflexible approach of
the ancient Hutcheson 4 decision was not. The persistence of the re-
ported opinion is, of course, a deeply imbedded feature of the common
law. However, to rely on a decision some ninety-seven years old and
thereby ignore the work-product of intervening judges is to invite
questioning doubts. But this occurred in Steel v. Murphy,45 the third
of the three significant cases decided during the 1918-1938 period.
Although the defendant contracted to convey land in fee simple he
could only convey his undivided interest. Mutuality of remedy was
absent. The defendant could not have obtained specific performance
if he so attempted since equity will not force a vendee to accept less
than that for which he bargained. Yet the equities of the situation were
sufficiently compelling to justify an exception.46 The court, neverthe-
less, refused to dilute the uncompromising Hutcheson rule. However,
after reiterating the strict rule that "equity will never decree perfor-
mance where the remedy is not mutual... ," they neatly sidestepped
the issue by invoking the precise question technique in finding that
this factual situation was not covered in the Hutcheson decision. In
this way they could grant relief without destroying the rule. Here,
unlike Hutcheson, the defendant possessed the power, on a unilateral
basis, to satisfy mutuality of remedy requirements by acquiring full
title to the property. Thus the defendant "if he had been able to pro-
duce a deed for the entire property, could have enforced specific per-
formance against the plaintiff . . .. ,4 Steel serves to illustrate the
hardships imposed by a blind commitment to an unrealistic doctrine.
V. THE FACT-SITUATION APPROACH OF
Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Company
The formalism of the Steinau statement of mutuality was put to
rest by the Supreme Court in 1939. 41 Not only was the doctrine changed
43 Corbin § 1184.
44 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
45 10 Ohio App. 150 (1918).
46 The theory being that "If the plaintiff is willing to overlook a defect in title or
a shortage in area and to pay the full agreed price, he [should] not [be] deprived of
his remedy by the fact that the vendor could not have compelled any performance by
the plaintiff." Corbin § 1196.
47 Steel v. Murphy, 10 Ohio App. 150, 154 (1918), citing Chancellor Kent.
48 Id.
49 Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939), noted
in 13 U. Cin. L. Rev. 586 (1939).
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so as to conform to the relative equities of the contracting parties, but
an endeavor was made to isolate and contain mutuality of obligation,
a concept that had become the source of much confusion.
In 1930, Joseph Fuchs paid 7,500 dollars for 15 shares of stock
in the United Motor Stage Company. Contemporaneously, Motor Stage,
who operated a fleet of buses, agreed to purchase all its gas, oil, and
grease supplies from Fuchs. The Company's duty to purchase was
binding so long as the stock remained in Fuchs' ownership. In 1937,
Motor Stage began to purchase the supplies in question from other
sources, despite the fact that title to the stock still remained in Fuchs.
There was no question that requirements contracts were binding
and enforcible. However, the Company argued that there was no
mutuality of remedy here since the plaintiff-supplier had a right of
termination; therefore his suit should be denied.
The court viewed this argument as a manifestation of the concep-
tual clash of the doctrines of consideration and mutuality of obligation.
The two principles were acknowledged as being separate concepts. As
to requirements contracts, "mutual promises are consideration one for
the other;" therefore, "so long as there is consideration for the obliga-
tion of the defendant, it is not essential that there be mutuality of
obligation."" ° As an abstract statement of a principle of law the court
was correct. However, the issue involved a contract termination rather
than a question of mutuality of obligation. Because of a failure to
make this distinction the court erroneously spoke of mutuality of
obligation when they should have addressed their attention to the en-
forcement of contract rights in favor of one having the power to
terminateY' The court was confronted with a situation where, because
Fuchs was not committed to furnishing supplies except so long as he
owned the stock, the defendant could be enjoined from buying from
other sources, but, while the ink was still wet on the decree, the plain-
tiff could unilaterally end his duty by disposing of the stock. What
assurance did the court have that after the framing of the decree bind-
ing Motor Stage, Fuchs would not immediately and with impunity
end the contract? Obviously, no assurance was possible.
Nevertheless, the negative covenant was specifically enforced. The
existence of what was labeled "collateral consideration, ' '52 in the form
of the 7,500 dollars paid by Fuchs for the 15 shares of stock, set a time
limit on the agreement. Having discerned the presence of "collateral
consideration," the deal was analogized to an option contract where
GO Id. at 515, 21 N.2d at 673.
51 Id. at 518-19, 21 N.E.2d at 674.
5M Id. at 519, 21 N.E.2d at 674.
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"the optionee may enforce the contract and compel the optioner to sell
at any time within the option period while he, as optionee, is not obliged
to buy." 3 The analogy is a needless and confusing injection of mutu-
ality of obligation. There is no dispute that the option requires con-
sideration, which is usually executed. But reciprocity of obligation is
unnecessary and, as a matter of fact, impossible. Here, there was suffi-
cient consideration to support an enforceable contract because Fuchs
promised to furnish all of the defendant's requirements, the latter
agreeing to abide by the agreement so long as Fuchs retained the stock.
Moreover, in the typical requirements contract, and under the Fuchs-
Motor Stage agreement, the correct sense" of mutuality of obligation
is present. 5 Thus given the presence of both consideration and mutual-
ity of obligation, the analogy to the option becomes a meaningless
gesture by the court.
The key to the court's endeavor to explain away the need for
reciprocity of obligation can be attributed, as mentioned above, to the
fact that power of termination was vested in the plaintiff. True, he was
obligated to perform, but only so long as he desired. The only limiting
factor would have been the time period required to find a purchaser
and dispose of the stock. Hence, to grant relief under this set of
facts would necessarily mean that the boundaries of Restatement sec-
tion 372, and its guarantee to the defendant of "good security that he
will receive specifically the agreed equivalent in exchange""0 would
be exceeded.
53 Id.
54 Obtaining a consistent and precise definition of mutuality of obligation is
difficult. Williston reasoned that to conclude that a contract is void for lack of mutuality
of obligation "is still a way of stating that there must be valid consideration." W.
Williston, supra note 8, at § 105A. If Williston's view is followed it means that exceptions,
e.g., infants contracts, unilateral contracts, and options, must be acknowledged. Corbin
criticizes the merger of mutuality of obligation with consideration; he defines the
former as meaning "that each party is under a legal duty to the other; each has made
a promise and each is an obligor." And in the final analysis "it is consideration that is
necessary, not mutuality of obligation." Thus the need for exceptions is eliminated. For
example, in the option "the option giver's promise is enforceable, in spite of lack of
mutuality of obligation." Corbin § 152. For a well-constructed criticism of Williston's
view see Ballantine, "Mutuality and Consideration," 28 Harv. L. Rev. 121 (1914).
See also G. Clark, Equity § 173 (1954).
5 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-306, comment 2 states that a requirements contract
does not "lack mutuality of obligation since, under this section, the party who will
determine quantity is required to operate his plant or conduct his business in good faith
and according to commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade so that his output
or requirements will approximate a reasonably foreseeable figure."
56 Restatement of Contracts § 372, comment a (1932).
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Nevertheless the result was justified. The policy upon which
section 372 is predicated is that courts should be provided with the
opportunity to weigh the respective merits of each party's position."
Here two factors tipped the scales in favor of the plaintiff. He submitted
himself to the court's jurisdiction-thus indicating a willingness to
continue performance. More importantly, there was a substantial
change of position on the plaintiff's part. He "expended large sums of
money in the equipment and in providing sufficient service for the
defendant .... 8
From the infrequency of subsequent reference 0 to the Fucks
decision it might be concluded that its liberal reasoning has had little,
if any, impact on Ohio case law. Such a conclusion would be inaccurate.
Consciously or otherwise, later cases do reflect the fact-situation ap-
proach utilized in Fuchs. For example, a sales contract provision giving
the plaintiff buyer the right to forfeit a small deposit and thereby can-
cel his order for a new car, which meant that even if specific perfor-
mance were granted the plaintiff could nevertheless withdraw his order,
was ignored by a common pleas court on the basis that the post-war
scarcity of automobiles made it more than likely that the plaintiff would
go through with the deal.60 Likewise, a court of appeals decision con-
tinued the fact-situation approach of Fuchs by justifying the Statute
of Frauds exception with a policy declaration that "While mutuality of
remedy may be a satisfactory test in some cases, it is not a rule of uni-
versal application to which all other principles of equity jurisprudence
pay homage ... ."I- This statement bears a striking but not unexpected
resemblance to the Fucks syllabus.62
67 Id.
G8 135 Ohio St. 509, 511, 21 N.E.2d 669, 671 (1939).
59 Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19 Ohio Op. 2d 130, 135 181
N.E.2d 506, 512 (C.P. 1961), negative covenant in professional basketball player's
contract enforced. Mose Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Kuhr, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 302, 308 (CF.
1959), negative covenant whereby defendant agreed not to engaged in scrap sheet iron
baling operations enforced.
60 DeMoss v. Conart Motor Sales, Inc., 34 Ohio Op. 535 (C-P. 1947). In support of
its conclusion, the court reasoned that "the equities of the case leave no other alternative.
The plaintiff is asking for no more than is just and proper. Furthermore compliance with
the court's order certainly works no hardship whatsoever on the defendant. It is only
being ordered to perform its contract, which will result in a profit (commission) to it!'
Id. at 537.
61 Ward v. Bickerstaff, 79 Ohio App. 362, 366 (1946), citing Restatement of
Contracts § 372 (1932).
62 See note 80 infra, and accompanying text.
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VI. PRESENT POSTURE OF MUTUALITY OF REMEDY: A SHIFT
FROM ABSTRACTIONISM TO PARTICULARISM
The classical version of mutuality of remedy, as reflected by the
Fry, Pomeroy, and Ames' series of statements, is no longer recognized
in Ohio. In light of the extensive quotations from Restatement section
372 by the court in Fuchs it might be assumed that the Hutcheson and
Steinau dogmatisms have been replaced by the Restatement of Con-
tracts view. However, section 372 is based on the existence of "good
security,"6 a concept designed to assure the defendant that he will
receive "specifically" that for which he bargained.64 The security must
be tangible or demonstrable and must meet the qualitative standard
of being "good."
Does the factual content of Fuchs measure up to these require-
ments? Did the investment by Fuchs of "large sums of money" in
equipment constitute "good security" for his counter-performance?
In Ohio it certainly did. In reaching this conclusion the court undertook
to define the Restatement's security standard.65 To equate change of
position by the plaintiff with sufficient security is to define the latter
phrase in terms of probabilities. Mere change of position, no matter
how substantial, can never constitute conclusive assurance of continued
performance. In addition, change of position appears in various shades
and in a wide assortment of forms; consequently any inquiry must
culminate in a subjective value judgment. The most that can be said
for a particular change of position is that it might make the failure of
return performance extremely unlikely.
Thus based upon the expressions found in the Fuchs opinion, Ohio's
mutuality of remedy standard is slightly more liberal and elastic than
that propounded by the Restatement. If counter-performance is at
63 Restatement of Contracts § 372, comment a (1932).
64 Id.
65 Justice Hart ignored 2H 373 and 376, both of which have a direct bearing on § 372.
Under § 373
specific enforcement may properly be refused if a substantial part of the agreed
exchange for the performance to be compelled is as yet unperformed and its
concurrent or future performance is not well secured to the satisfaction of the
court.
Section 376 states that specific performance will not be refused a plaintiff "merely
because he has a power to terminate, . .. unless the power can be used in spite of the
decree in such a way as to deprive the defendant of the agreed exchange for his per-
formance." Section 376 would be applicable to the Fuchs situation because, among
other things, it applies "where the party having the power of termination has rendered
part performance or . . . materially changed his position in reliance on the contract."
Restatement of Contracts § 376, comment b (1932).
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least probable, the court is free to grant specific performance. Hence,
the decision as to whether specific performance will or should be
granted turns upon the fact situation itself.00 Under a fact-situation
approach the court is not bound to the immutable abstractions of Fry
and Pomeroy. Instead, it can endeavor to shape a result more com-
patible with the flexible norms of equity.
A. The Influence of External Pressures
The gradual shift by the Ohio courts from abstraction to the
particularistic, which is manifested through an interest in achieving
a "just" solution relative to the litigants before the court at a given
instant, is in conformity with the broad historical movement of the
law. Such a conclusion is to do no more than acknowledge that legal
problem resolution is, in the final analysis, geared to the ferment
arising from the social, political, and economic environment of the
nation.
7
In the beginning of Ohio's industrial development, contractual re-
lationships required a high degree of protection. It was necessary
that all parties to a transaction be assured of absolute reciprocity
of performance. The most efficacious manner by which courts could
comply with this need was through a decision-making process geared
to predictability. As a result of the environmental needs of "The
Age of Pomeroy" and "The Quiet Period," merchants were, for
one, assured of the protection of a right to freedom of contract.
During this period,"8 the Supreme Court of the United States im-
posed a creed of economic laissez faire upon the nation with such
gusto that Mr. Justice Holmes was prompted to utter his classic
complaint that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen
to the State or of laissez faire."0 9 Secondly, merchants were sure to
receive consistent responses from the courts on any legal problem that
might arise. The effect of this consistency of response was to provide
capitalists with a foundation of confidence and foreseeability that was
necessary.
66 Such a view is not incompatible with Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.90(a)
(Page 1962): "Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.)
67 For an in-depth study of the relationship between the resolution of questions of
contract law and the economic, social, and political moods of the community at a given
time see L. Friedman, Contract Law in America (1965).
68 See generally S. Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State (1956); R.
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (rev. ed. 1955).
09 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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As the economy matured, and as new social and political pressures
were generated, the balance between the need for abstraction and
predictability on one hand, and a concern for an equitable solution
at a given time on the other hand, tipped in favor of the latter. As one
commentator summed up this change:
The Courts have moved from a policy of aiding the functioning of
the market as their primary goal . . . to one of carrying out the
reasonable expectations of the parties in a particular transac-tion .... 70
Another significant factor in the change was the controversial repudia-
tion by the so-called "realists" of mechanical jurisprudence. Upon
shattering the illusion that law is or can be made approximately
stationary and certain,7 the influence of external factors upon the
decision-making process became a part of the legal scene. The mutu-
ality of remedy decisions became a small part of the trend away from
legal abstraction toward a particularistic approach emphasizing fair-
ness.
B. The Role of the Syllabus Rule in the Development of Mutuality of
Remedy
In Ohio the "law" of each Supreme Court decision appears in a
court prepared and approved syllabus. 721 Since the adoption of the
syllabus rule in 1858, the issue of mutuality of remedy has come under
70 Macaulay, Law and the Balance of Power: The Automobile Manufacturers and
Their Dealers 2 (1966). Perhaps the most extreme manifestation of the contemporary
particularistic concern of the legal system is registered in the "unconscionable" contract
provision first developed as part of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302.
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.15(A) (Page 1962).
71 See generally J. Stone, Legal System And Lawyers' Reasonings (1964).
72 A syllabus of the points decided by the Court in each case, shall be stated,
in writing, by the judge assigned to deliver the opinion of the Court, which
shall be confined to the points of law, arising from the facts of the case, that
have been determined by the Court. And the syllabus shall be submitted to the
judges concurring therein, for revisal, before publication thereof; and it shall
be inserted in the book of reports without alteration, unless by consent of the
judges concurring therein.
S Ohio St. vii (1858). This is now Rule VI of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice.
See also State ex rel. Donahey v. Edmondson, 89 Ohio St. 93, 107-8, 105 N.E. 269, 273
(1913).
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the Ohio Supreme Court's consideration four times.73 In two cases,
one of which was the influential Steinau decision, 4 there was no
express syllabus reference to the doctrine. In another decision the full
extent of syllabization is contained in the word "mutuality"75 without
any qualifying terms. The first and only complete syllabization of the
rule appeared in Fuchs:
So long as there is consideration ... it is not always essential that
there be mutuality of remedy... to enable the seller to specifically
enforce the obligation of the buyer to purchase under such
contract.7
6
It is apparent that without a simultaneous reading of the text
of the Fucks opinion, the syllabus statement of the rule is of little
stare decisis value. To say that "it is not always essential that there
be mutuality of remedy ' 77 is to do more than recognize the existence
of exceptions-something that even Fry was prepared to do. Express
reference to the "good security" standard is lacking. Moreover if the
syllabus rule is narrowly applied, it can be argued that the doctrine
of mutuality of remedy never existed until it appeared in the Fuchs
syllabus. Such a conclusion is clearly wrong. Certainly the Steinau
doctrine was effectively sustained.
A citation profile of the thirty-five cases discussing the mutuality
of remedy problem reveals a tendency by the courts to ignore syllabus
reference in favor of text, case, and treatise citation. Treatise reference
dominated decision drafting by six out of fourteen cases during the
Steinau era, 1891-1912, resulting in the Pomeroy statement taking on
the character of a syllabus."8
73 Fuchs v. United Motor Stage Co., 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669 (1939);
Wiedemann Brewing Co. v. Maxwell, 78 Ohio St. 54, 84 N.E. 595 (1908); Steinau v.
Cincinnati Gas-Light & Coke Co., 48 Ohio St. 324, 27 N.E. 545 (1891); Richards v.
Doyle, 36 Ohio St. 37 (1880).
74 The other case is Richards v. Doyle, 36 Ohio St. 37 (1880).
75 "Written agreements known as options are not necessarily void for lack of
mutuality .... " Wiedemann Brewing Co. v. Maxwell, 78 Ohio St. 54, 84 N.E. 595 (1908).
76 135 Ohio St. 509, 21 N.E.2d 669, 670 (1939).
77 Id.
78 Professor Friedman labels this period "the golden age of contract." After noting
that it was an era dominated by "great expository treatises," he says
The abstract, negative, and impersonal character of classical contract law made
it relatively simple to freeze contract law into what Professor Page, writing in
1905, called a "rational and harmonious system." The treatise-writers wove
contract law into a set of "scientific" principles, logically interrelated and stated
in an orderly manner. . . . On paper at least, the treatises transformed the
living law of contract into a fabric of black-letter rules-a kind of unwritten
and sluggishly evolutionary civil code.
L. Friedman, supra note 67, at 211.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Clearly, if the development and expansion of mutuality of remedy
depended solely upon syllabus amplification it would never have at-
tained its present posture. 79 What did occur was that the rule evolved
completely within the analytical give and take of responsive decision
drafting, for the most part independent of the syllabus."
79 One might conclude that the syllabus rule, as a legacy of the age of mechanical
jurisprudence, is generally ignored by Ohio courts.
80 Of the two cases citing Fuchs, Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 19
Ohio Op. 2d 130, 135, 181 N.E.2d 506, 512 (C.P. 1961), relied on text while the other,
Mose Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. Kuhr, 85 Ohio L. Abs. 302, 308 (C.P. 1959), utilized the
syllabus.
The overall effectiveness of the syllabus system is open to serious question. Karl
Llewellyn, after 1939 and 1953 studies of Ohio Supreme Court opinions concluded that
not even a syllabus system can escape from the fact that:
Divergent, mutually inconsistent precedent techniques are at work in the daily
mine-run of appelate cases. The little case, the ordinary case, is a constant
occasion and vehicle for creative choice and creative activity, for the shaping
and on-going reshaping of our case law. (Emphasis deleted.)
K. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 99 (1960). See generally Report of the
Cincinnati Conference on the Status of the Rule of Stare Decisis, 14 U. Cin. L. Rev.
203 (1940).
